Canon Law for 2 Person Games
Game theory references diverse bargaining scenarios by the “characteristic function” (CF) of the game analysed. For these purposes, two-person games are addressed in cooperative form—meaning a mutually beneficial mechanism becomes available to address welfare of “both” players.
Canonical Arbitration
It may seem counter-intuitive to render whole world populations into binary “games”. Games are accentuated, because it becomes theoretically possible to form agreement or consensus on two players interacting, especially if we assume both players are “representatives” or “agents”, where the game then provides potential for scale by “whole world populations” reaching agreement through such representation (game theoretically expressed as a “grand coalition”) — or in ordinary translation, previously adversarial relationships evolve into something without ready requirement for mediation.
In mathematics and computer science, an object is canonical where it takes a uniquely identifiable standard or unified form. This is important for security, hashing, and reliability and borrows from Canon Law in that the layout is legal but is not in itself an ecclesiastical term.
In Game Theory, as orientated by John Forbes Nash Jr., there is a more formally defined cross-over between computational canonical form and Canon Law, where machines are used in pre-emptive dispute resolution, providing basis for “order” in a deterministic scheme of robotic attorney agents removing verbal range parameters in establishing equilibrium.
Reflections on Genesis
The differentiation of two and three person games might be explained by the “trustless” agency of the “third” player, which in the world of today can be referred to as “blockchain” or similar computer software systems like triple entry accounting — both these designs appear co-incidental in working with multiple digital signatures.
If we then take Nash’s The Bargaining Problem (1950), where an axiomatic approach leads to a definite formula for the canonical arbitration of a bargaining problem, the two players have the possibility to gain mutual benefits if they can agree on a formula for cooperation.
This dovetails with Nash’s belief in uniqueness required for strong game theoretic solutions, where the mathematician should only have to state a problem and general method of computation to the machine in almost ordinary mathematical style, where the machine is an umpire enforcing contracts. The game is therefore cooperative in characteristic function.
If we then further consider the common two-person analogy of Alice and Bob in describing arrangements of multi-signatories, then the signatories as coalitional representations might eventually render Alice and Bob as Adam and Eve, where the religiously inspired genesis metaphor in bitcoin becomes synonymous with an extensive form (Merkle) Tree of Life.
